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Abstract 
This paper introduces and evaluates a new image-
based CAPTCHA named Nouncaptcha. 
Nouncaptcha has users analyze an image and 
select the nouns in that image from a list. This 
process is done for several rounds, until the user 
earns sufficient credit to be considered human. To 
generate and grade these prompts, Nouncaptcha 
draws from a database of tagged images. This tag 
database is fed by a video game based off of von 
Ahn and Dabbish’s ESP Game [13].  
 
User testing indicates that humans fare well on 
Nouncaptcha prompts.  Moreover, surveyed users 
found Nouncaptcha easy and generally preferable 
when compared to reCAPTCHA, a popular 
CAPTCHA [26]. This paper also performs a threat 
analysis on Nouncaptcha. This threat analysis 
suggests that Nouncaptcha is capable of resisting 
brute-force attacks, dictionary attacks, and 
current computer vision methods. 
 
1. Introduction and Motivation 
CAPTCHAs (Completely Automated Public Turing 
tests to tell Computers and Humans Apart) are a 
class of artificial intelligence (AI) problems that 
have gained popularity preventing website abuse. 
CAPTCHAs are useful because malicious online 
activity is most destructive when automated and 
carried out at speeds much greater than humans 
can achieve. A CAPTCHA can be used to identify 
non-human users and prevent such automated 
activity, ranging from spamming online polls to 
rapidly registering fake accounts.  
 
CAPTCHAs come in several forms, but by far the 
most popular designs are text-based and rely on 
obfuscation techniques to prevent character 
recognition. The wide-spread popularity of text-
based CAPTCHAs has led to fierce competition 
between CAPTCHA designers and attackers. 
Unfortunately, this is a competition CAPTCHA 
designers are losing. For example, Bursztein, et al. 
were able to compromise or outright defeat 13 of 
15 popular, previously unbroken text-based 
CAPTCHA designs in 2011 [6]. 
 
Fortunately, it can be argued that the defeat of 
those CAPTCHAs was a positive development. This 
is because the original CAPTCHA paper by von 
Ahn, et al. [1] proposed a twofold purpose for 
CAPTCHAs: to provide an effective Turing Test (eg: 
to tell humans and computers apart), and to 
present an unsolved AI problem. Such a system 
continually serves the greater good, either by 
successfully rate-limiting online activity, or by 
bringing about a meaningful technological 
advance in its defeat. 
 
Unfortunately, there are no well-tested, widely-
deployed schemes ready to compliment or 
replace character recognition CAPTCHAs. This will 
become a problem as the development of more 
and more sophisticated software eventually 
brings us to a point where text-based CAPTCHAs 
are easier for computers than for humans. In fact, 
as of April 2014, Google’s street view technology 
can solve reCAPTCHA (an otherwise 
uncompromised design) with 99% accuracy [29]. 
Although the required technology for this attack 
is not publicly available, and reCAPTCHA is 
secured by additional measures, this is a serious 
blow to text-based CAPTCHAs. In a similar vein, 
Bursztein, et al. have shown that audio CAPTCHAs 
(which often compliment text CAPTCHAs for 
accessibility reasons) may be very near a similar 
Human-vs-AI tipping point, if not past it [7, 8].  
 
Another motivating concern is usability. Current 
CAPTCHA schemes can prove quite difficult for 
some users to solve [8]. This is a problem, as 
CAPTCHAs ideally present a low barrier to entry 
for humans. On top of this, CAPTCHAs will only 
grow more cumbersome as smartphones and 
tablets continue to gain popularity. CAPTCHA 
designers can no longer assume that users will be 
using a keyboard and mouse. Likewise, mobile 
devices feature a wide range of screen sizes and 
aspect ratios that will need to be supported [25]. 
At the moment, it appears that simple button- 
and image-based CAPTCHAs are superior to text-
based designs on mobile devices, both in terms of 
completion time and accuracy [10]. It is also 
worth noting that with current technology, voice 
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recognition is not particularly usable for text-
based CAPTCHA responses [10]. 
 
Ultimately, having a variety of distinct, AI-hard 
(eg: difficult for a computer) problems is critical to 
the success of CAPTCHAs in their cat and mouse 
game balancing ease of use and security. Why, 
then, have few unique, provably secure classes of 
CAPTCHAs been widely deployed? It appears this 
is because CAPTCHAs are a particularly difficult 
class of problem to design. They must be 
automatically generated and graded, while 
remaining adequately difficult to thwart even the 
most advanced computer systems (ideally with a 
< 1/10,000 bot success rate [7, 12]). This is 
complicated further by human usability 
constraints. von Ahn, who is among those 
credited with the invention of the CAPTCHA, 
suggests that the maximum failure rate a user will 
tolerate is somewhere around 10% [3].  
 
2. Types of CAPTCHAs 
Today, many types of CAPTCHAs have been 
designed, each with unique characteristics. To 
analyze these CAPTCHA schemes, it is best to 
classify them into four general categories: text 
(character recognition), images (labeling or 
grouping), audio (interpreting stated 
letters/numbers), and video (identifying moving 
letters, or doing a semantic task like labeling). 
 
As was mentioned earlier, text CAPTCHAs attempt 
to make it difficult for a computer to segment an 
image containing text into individual letters. This 
is done using character overlap, rotation, random 
character sizes/fonts, random string lengths, 
“waving” (bending the string up and down), and a 
variety of other distortions [6]. Text CAPTCHAs 
are well tested, and can be quite effective if they 
are implemented properly (both the Google 
CAPTCHA and reCAPTCHA are essentially 
uncompromised, for example) [6, 29]. 
Unfortunately, many text-based CAPTCHAs either 
rely on flawed obfuscation techniques, or are not 
implemented with the attention to detail needed 
to be secure [6, 11].  
 
Image CAPTCHAs have been implemented by ESP-
PIX (now defunct), Confident, What’s Up 
CAPTCHA, Sketcha, and the (defeated) Asirra 
CAPTCHA, among others [14, 2, 3, 4, 9, 10, 24, 
28]. These CAPTCHAs are generally cognitive 
tasks. For example, in ESP-PIX a user must select 
one of ~70 categories which 4 presented images 
fit, and in Asirra a user must click on pictures of 
cats. Sketcha and What’s Up CAPTCHA are also 
cognitive tasks, and have users identify correct 
upright orientations for images. It is important to 
note that all of these CAPTCHAs are vulnerable to 
computer vision and machine learning attacks if 
their image databases do not have sufficient 
variety. In fact, insufficient variety was what 
ultimately compromised the Asirra CAPTCHA [9].  
 
Image recognition CAPTCHAs must also avoid 
leaking solutions through their prompts. For 
example, the IMAGINA-TION CAPTCHA has users 
identify the boundaries between randomly 
selected, distorted, and overlapped images [28]. 
Unfortunately, such boundaries can be identified 
with no semantic knowledge at all. Rather than 
interpreting the meaning of the presented 
images, an attacker can identify a solution from 
broken object outlines and mis-matched textures 
[27]. Such information leaking can seriously 
undermine the efficacy of a CAPTCHA scheme. 
 
Audio CAPTCHAs are a fairly common accessibility 
option, and are meant to assist users who have 
difficulty with text-based CAPTCHAs. The most 
popular types are “non-continuous” and state 
letters or numbers masked by adversarial noise 
and static. In their current state, however, audio 
CAPTCHAs are critically flawed and offer minimal 
protection from bots [7]. Audio CAPTCHAs have 
also proven quite difficult for humans to solve [8]. 
 
Finally, there are Video CAPTCHAs, which 
generally consist of a cognitive task like labeling 
the content of a video [15], or an identification 
task like that in the popular NuCaptcha [16]. 
NuCaptcha has users type a set of characters 
displayed in a video prompt. The security of 
NuCaptcha has been called into question, 
however, after being thwarted in a paper by 
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Reynaga, et al. as well as by Bursztein [12, 17]. 
Both studies compromised NuCaptcha by taking 
advantage of the extra information a video 
provides. Rather than having only one view of the 
prompt to analyze, an array of frames can be 
captured and studied, resulting in greater solution 
certainty than any one frame could deliver.  
 
Reynaga, et al. also investigated the use of 
“emerging images” in a CAPTCHA. Emerging 
images are a phenomenon where humans can 
observe patterns in what computers would 
consider meaningless static. Ultimately, their 
study concluded that a more desirable CAPTCHA 
scheme would leverage human understandings 
(such as the relative size of objects), rather than 
continuing the development of character 
recognition CAPTCHAs [12].  
 
 
3. Other Related Work 
Beyond existing work in CAPTCHAs, studies on 
topics ranging from image tagging to usability 
were valuable while creating Nouncaptcha. For 
instance, Nouncaptcha’s guessing game was 
inspired by von Ahn and Dabbish’s ESP game and 
its use in the ESP-PIX CAPTCHA [13, 14].  
Microsoft Research further refined the ESP game 
by developing strategies to get a greater number 
of higher quality tags than seen in the original ESP 
game [22]. 
 
Nouncaptcha also built off of CAPTCHA breaking 
research, particularly work by Zhu, et al. and 
Golle. Zhu, et al. defeated a wide range of image-
based CAPTCHAs and outlined potential 
improvements to future image CAPTCHAs [27]. 
Golle defeated the Asirra CAPTCHA and explained 
its vulnerabilities, while also highlighting which 
aspects of Asirra were sound [9]. Lastly, Bursztein 
has several papers on the general art of breaking 
CAPTHCAs, particularly on breaking audio and 
text-based CAPTCHAs [6, 7]. 
 
Finally, several usability studies proved useful 
while designing and testing Nouncaptcha. 
Bursztein, et al. studied a wide array of text and 
audio CAPTCHAs using Amazon Mechanical Turk 
[8]. The resulting paper gave useful insight into 
running a CAPTCHA usability study on MTurk, as 
did Ross, Halderman, and Finkelstein’s study of 
Sketcha [3]. Finally, Wismer, et al. conducted a 
study of several mobile-optimized CAPTCHAs, and 
identified ideal CAPTCHA inputs for touch devices 
[10]. 
 
4. Inspiration from an Unsolved Problem 
So where would a new CAPTCHA fit in? What 
types of AI problems still need solving, and how 
could one leverage such a problem? An interesting 
space to consider is unconstrained object 
identification: the difficult AI problem of 
identifying objects in an image with no constraint 
on what the image could contain. This has been 
the basis of several proposed CAPTCHA designs 
[3, 4, 5], but such CAPTCHAs face a serious 
challenge: automatically generating prompts that 
are consistently solvable by humans. Asirra, a 
CAPTCHA proposed by Microsoft Research, hoped 
to address prompt generation by building off of a 
very large pet-adoption site’s image database [2].  
 
Unfortunately, because Asirra prompts were 
limited to only images of cats and dogs, it was 
quickly compromised. Golle was able to train a set 
of Support Vector Machines (SVMs) to solve an 
Asirra prompt with 10.3% accuracy, effectively 
rendering the CAPTCHA useless [9]. Still, Golle 
acknowledged that Asirra presents an appealing 
usability improvement over text-based 
CAPTCHAs, and notes that it could be improved to 
adequate levels of security with some 
modification [9]. 
 
5. A New CAPTCHA: Nouncaptcha 
This paper proposes a new CAPTCHA, named 
Nouncaptcha, which is focused on recreating the 
usability of Asirra while avoiding the pitfalls of its 
limited breadth of prompts. Nouncaptcha is a 
relatively simple test which challenges a user’s 
uniquely human ability to quickly and accurately 
identify what nouns appear in an image. 
 
Nouncaptcha consists of two systems working in 
tandem. The first is an image tagging game similar 
to the “The ESP game” [13]. The second is a 
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CAPTCHA which feeds off of the game’s tags. This 
CAPTCHA is in many ways inspired by the ESP-PIX 
CAPTCHA derived from the original ESP game 
[14]. ESP-PIX had users label a group of images by 
choosing a word from a large, unchanging list. 
This idea has been modified in various ways since 
it was created. Most notably a mobile version was 
implemented and tested in 2012 [10]. The mobile 
version was iPad optimized and presented all ~70 
possible tags to the user as buttons below a set of 
prompt images.  
 
Nouncaptcha presents a similar task through a 
much simpler UI. Users analyze only one image at 
a time, and pick tags from a short, dynamically 
generated list. The hope is that this design will be 
preferable to traditional text-based CAPTCHAs for 
all users, regardless of device. 
 
Beyond usability goals, there are security and 
efficiency factors to consider. With regards to this 
Google identified three core measures of a good 
CAPTCHA in the paper “What’s Up CAPTCHA” [4]: 
 
1. New challenges can be generated and 
graded automatically. 
2. The CAPTCHA is easy for humans to solve 
(as noted earlier, our goal is a >90% 
success rate). 
3. The CAPTCHA is difficult to solve using a 
computer (again, with a < 1/10000 AI 
success rate being acceptable). 
 
All three of these points will be considered when 
Nouncaptcha’s design is detailed and evaluated 
later in this paper. This paper will also measure 
user preference, and will evaluate whether 
Nouncaptcha is as usable as reCAPTCHA (a 
popular character recognition CAPTCHA) on 
various device form-factors. 
 
6. Design (The Guessing Game) 
The key to Nouncaptcha’s design is “The Guessing 
Game”, an image tagging video game meant to 
ensure Nouncaptcha presents a wide variety of 
tags on an equally wide variety of images.  The 
guessing game fulfills these needs by grabbing 
liberally licensed images from Flickr, and having 
users tag those images while playing a video 
game. As was mentioned earlier, this concept was 
first pioneered by the ESP-Game in 2004 [13]. 
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At the game’s start users are presented with a 
pop-up explaining the guessing game’s rules in a 
few short sentences. The basic goal is to get 
points by matching nouns with a partner, while 
only using words not on an off-limits list. The 
catch is that players have no means of 
communication other than an image that both 
players see. When a player guesses a noun their 
partner agrees with, the player will advance to a 
new image. 
 
Players are told that they will only play for either 
15 images or until a timer is depleted. This timer 
starts at 2.5 minutes, and every match adds 15 
seconds. Matches also reward the player with 500 
points, while skips deduct 25 points and add no 
time. Flagging is an option, too, though it is not 
explicitly mentioned to the user. This feature is 
meant to help the game’s operators identify 
potentially offensive or broken images. Because 
flags are important to keeping the game fun and 
friendly, a flag is rewarded in the same manner as 
a match. To encourage the player to at least 
attempt every image, the flag and skip options are 
hidden until 4 seconds have elapsed. 
 
Once in a game, players are made aware of their 
progress by a completion bar below the image 
they are guessing on. Players are also shown a 
global average of all scores, so one can measure 
their performance relative to the average user, or 
even compete against it. Finally, the entire game 
is designed to work equally well on both desktop 
and mobile devices. This was achieved by using 
Twitter’s bootstrap CSS libraries while designing 
the game. 
 
These rules and design choices are meant to 
encourage a specific set of outcomes. In 
particular, the game is set up to encourage 
skipping images when no obvious nouns remain, 
while still motivating users to provide tags when 
they can. Simply getting lots of obvious tags is not 
enough, though, as Nouncaptcha relies on an 
image’s tags being widely varied and unique. The 
game’s off limits list is meant to encourage this 
variety. The off-limits list acts like the taboo list 
from the ESP game; it keeps users from 
repeatedly providing known tags by banning them 
from an image. This expands the variety of tags 
for a given image by motivating players to 
Pictured: The Guessing Game 
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consider nouns that do not necessarily come to 
mind first. 
 
There is also the issue of determining which 
guesses should be considered valid tags, and 
which of those valid tags should be made off-
limits. In the guessing game tags are found by 
comparing a current player’s guesses to a 
previous player’s guesses. If both players guess a 
certain word for an image, then that word is 
added to the image’s list of tags. After a tag is 
added a sufficient number of times (5 in this 
implementation), the tag is considered valid and 
is made off limits.  
 
There is a key difference between this scheme 
and that used in the ESP game: the guessing game 
is entirely single-player. Rather than paring users 
with another person, users are presented the 
illusion of multiplayer and play against a previous 
player’s set of guesses. This design was chosen to 
make the guessing game easier to get off the 
ground with few concurrent users. It was also 
important to ensure every response from a small 
group of test users would be useful. The original 
ESP game took a different approach, focusing on 
live games between players. In the ESP game 
single player games were played against a 
recording of a player from a multi-player game. 
This design was ruled out for the guessing game, 
as it limits the value of a single player game to re-
enforcing the tag set for previously played 
images. 
 
To make single-player only gameplay work, the 
first time an image is presented the game waits 
for either 5 guesses or 7 seconds of guessing, and 
then assumes the user gave some valid tag. That 
initial set of guesses is then used with players who 
come afterward, and is replaced when a user 
skips (so long as that user has provided at least 
one guess). This design is based on the 
observation in pilot studies that users who skip 
generally guess as many words as they can before 
pressing the skip button. This makes it likely that 
the next user to play will have a match. An image 
is taken out of circulation after hitting a sufficient 
skip count, which is incremented by every skip, 
and decrements (to a minimum value of 0) with 
every successful match. Images with few or no 
remaining tags should be skipped often, allowing 
this scheme to keep users focused on images that 
still need tagging. 
 
7. Evaluation of the Guessing Game 
To ensure the Guessing Game can be relied upon 
for a variety of tags, a study was conducted using 
Amazon Mechanical Turk users (Turkers) and 
others recruited via Facebook and email. The 
study consisted of a basic usability and preference 
survey, along with an analysis of tag quality.  
 
7.1   Demographics 
Respondent breakdown 
Qty of responses: 62 
Age: Mean: 30.7 Min: 19 Max: 60 
Gender: Male: 66% Female: 33% 
Speak English: Yes: 98.4% No: 1.6% 
Native English 
Speaker: 
Yes: 85.5% No: 14.5% 
 
Education Level (Attending or Attained) 
No Response: 0% 
Less than High School: 0% 
High School: 8.1% 
Associates: 11.3% 
BS: 58.1% 
Greater than a BS: 22.6% 
 
Device Types (Self-reported) 
 Keyboard Touch/ 
Mobile 
No Response 
What type of 
input did you 
use: 
80.6% 6.5% 12.9% 
 
In the above data 9 users natively spoke 
languages other than English. In specific, 5 users 
natively spoke Tamil, while other users natively 
spoke Hindi (1), Telugu (1), Macedonian (1), or 
Russian (1). It is worth noting that native language 
did not appear to influence enjoyment of the 
game, with 8 of 9 non-native English speakers 
saying they found the game fun. Also, game logs 
indicate that non-native speakers were able to 
agree with native speakers on tags for images. 
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7.2   Data 
Survey Data 
 Yes No No Response 
Did you enjoy 
the game: 
88.7% 11.3% 0% 
Did you follow 
the game’s 
rules: 
93.6% 4.8% 1.6% 
Did you only 
provide nouns: 
95.2% 4.8% 0% 
Were prompt 
images large 
enough and easy 
to understand: 
91.9% 6.5% 1.6% 
 
Image Tag Data 
Images Grabbed: 50 
Avg tags per image: 4.51 
Unique nouns in tag set: 108 
Non-nouns in tag set: 1 
Images with taboo tags: 45 
Avg taboo tags per image: 
(among images with taboo tags) 
1.38 
 
Game Log Data 
Unique games played: 
(with >1 round) 
104 
Avg rounds per game: 9.08 
Avg successful tags per game: 8.29 
Visits to free play link following 
survey: 
(some did not actually play) 
111 
Survey Instrument and logging detailed in Appendix I. 
 
7.3   Results 
For this study 50 Creative Commons images were 
pre-fetched from Flickr using a script. Users then 
played the guessing game against those images. 
By the end of usability testing the game had 
generated a total of 221 tags using 108 unique 
nouns. There was also one adjective tag, which 
was only agreed upon by players once. 
 
Unfortunately, the game only generated an 
average of 1.38 off-limits tags per image. This was 
largely the result of the limited number of survey 
participants, and the comparatively large number 
of images used in the study.  
 
Luckily, if the off-limits threshold was reduced 
from 5 tag occurrences to 4, the average image 
had 1.62 off-limits tags. Likewise, if the off-limits 
threshold was further reduced to 2, the average 
image had 2.73 off-limits tags. Being able to 
adjust the off-limits threshold proved useful in 
Nouncaptcha’s implementation, as Nouncaptcha 
relies on off-limits tags to generate prompts. 
Ultimately, the off-limits threshold was revised to 
4 after the guessing game’s testing finished. As a 
result, 26 of 50 images had 2 or more off-limits 
tags. This allowed Nouncaptcha to present a fairly 
diverse set of prompts, while still using tags with a 
high level of certainty. 
 
The usability survey showed encouraging results, 
with 88.7% of users saying they found the game 
enjoyable. Even more promising were the mobile 
user responses, with all 4 mobile users saying 
they found the game enjoyable. Though this was 
a small sample, it is good to see mobile users 
found the game fun. Given the guessing game’s 
simple rules and short duration, it may be a good 
candidate for a casual mobile game. 
 
It also appears that users were willing to play of 
their own accord. 111 games were served from a 
link that followed the usability survey. Of these 
games 44 were actually played and generated 
usable data.  
 
Ultimately, the game worked. The tags generated 
were nearly all nouns, and there was a fairly wide 
variety of unique nouns used. Also, users 
generally found the game fun. Still, there were 
two frequent improvement requests worth noting 
for a real-world deployment: 
 
 Make the game’s instructions very 
concise. Some users reported not 
understanding the game’s mechanics, 
such as what the off-limits list was for. 
These concepts were explained on an 
instructions page, but it appears most did 
not read it. A popup with a summary of 
rules was added later in the study to 
address this. 
 Ensure the game is served with adequate 
resources. This study was implemented 
on Heroku’s free tier, so some users had 
to wait for a “dyno wakeup” [18]. This 
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degraded the user experience by adding a 
~30 second wait to the game’s start. 
 
8. Design (Nouncaptcha) 
As was mentioned earlier, Nouncaptcha is 
designed to take advantage of image tags 
generated by the guessing game. Nouncaptcha 
does this by serving random images from the 
guessing game’s database. The user is then asked 
to indicate what nouns appear in the image from 
a set of 6 check boxes. Once submitted, 
Nouncaptcha grades the user’s selection using a 
point scale. The user gets 1 point for being served 
a prompt, and loses 1 point for every incorrect 
check box. For example, if a user selects one box 
incorrectly and neglects to select a box that 
should have been checked, the user’s score is -1 
(eg:        ). The goal in Nouncaptcha is to 
score 2 points in 5 or fewer prompts. 
 
 
This scheme was designed to strongly discourage 
guessing and to punish errors by potential AI, 
while allowing human users the opportunity to 
recover from small mistakes. The overall 
probability of a random success in the first two 
prompts is 
 
          
 or  
 
    
. If a user makes one 
mistake in their first two prompts, then they must 
complete at least three prompts. This is because 
the user’s revised minimum score after a mistake 
would be: 1 + 0 + 1 = 2 points. The probability of 
success in this case is 
 
            
 or 
 
       
. 
Following this point, the probability of a random 
success continues to drop at an exponential rate. 
This makes  
 
    
 (eg: making no mistakes in first 
two prompts) an attacker’s best chance of success 
with truly random guessing.  
 
Nouncaptcha grades user responses by 
determining what nouns are in the prompt image 
and what nouns are unlikely to be in that image. 
Correct choices are chosen from a random sample 
of 0 to 6 of the image’s off-limits tags. Afterward 
another 0 to 6 incorrect tags are selected for a 
total of 6 options. These incorrect tags are 
randomly selected from all tags in the guessing 
game’s database not associated with the prompt 
image. Incorrect tags also cannot appear in an 
image’s “contentious tags” list.  
 
The contentious tags list is a set of tags that were 
presented as incorrect for an image in the past 
and were mistaken as correct. This list allows 
Nouncaptcha to learn what tags are frequently 
mistaken as correct for an image, and avoid 
presenting those options.  
 
Despite its potential usability value, the 
contentious tag system presents an attack vector 
that deserves to be addressed. An attacker could 
potentially spam Nouncaptcha and select every 
check box. Eventually, every incorrect tag would 
become contentious, and only correct options 
would be presented by Nouncaptcha. This type of 
attack is addressed by having contentious tags 
maintain a count of how often they are mistaken 
on an image. This count increments every time a 
tag is mistakenly selected for an image, and 
decrements every time a tag is correctly not 
selected. This count can become infinitely 
negative, so tags that were mistaken once can 
remain in circulation if obviously incorrect. Also, 
Pictured: A nouncaptcha prompt 
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in this study’s contentious tag implementation, 
tags are taken out of circulation after reaching a 
count of two. A higher count could be required if 
an operator would like to have greater safety 
from spam attacks. Finally, a token bucket 
scheme like that proposed in Asirra could be 
used. The token bucket would assign a quantity of 
“tokens” to an IP address and consume the 
tokens with mistakes. Such a scheme could be 
used to detect and automatically ignore the 
mistakes of spam attackers [2]. It is worth nothing 
that a bot net, or other attacker with many IP 
addresses would require different 
countermeasures. Such a situation has been 
deemed out of scope for this paper, though it will 
be touched upon in section 10.2. 
 
Another feature of Nouncaptcha is the progress 
bar below the prompt. This indicates how far the 
user has progressed, moving very quickly for the 
first two images. If the user does not succeed in 
the first two images, the bar moves more slowly 
for the remaining prompts. This lets users know 
how they are doing, while not revealing any 
information about mistakes to attackers. In 
particular, the progress bar reveals no 
information about the user’s score or which 
prompts were failed. This is meant to prevent an 
attacker from randomly answering prompts and 
assembling a dictionary of correct and incorrect 
prompt solutions. 
 
9. Nouncaptcha Usability Evaluation 
Nouncaptcha was usability tested through a 
survey comparing it to a sample of 12 real-world 
reCAPTCHA prompts. The survey recorded 
completion times for both reCAPTCHA and 
Nouncaptcha, logged user accuracy in 
Nouncaptcha, and asked users about their 
preferences. This survey was advertised using 
Amazon Mechanical Turk, and via word of mouth. 
A total of 60 users tested Nouncaptcha, of whom 
53 were in the US. The remaining users were in 
India (4), Djibouti (1), Russia (1), or did not specify 
(1). 
 
 
 
9.1   Demographics 
Respondent breakdown 
Qty of responses: 60 
Age: Mean: 35.6 Min: 19 Max: 56 
Gender: Male: 60.3% Female: 39.7% 
Speak English: Yes: 100% No: 0% 
Native English 
Speaker: 
Yes: 91% No: 9% 
 
Education Level (Attending or Attained) 
No Response: 1.7% 
Less than High School: 3.3% 
High School: 20% 
Associates: 15% 
BS: 46.7% 
Greater than a BS: 13.3% 
 
Device Types (Self-reported) 
 Keyboard Touch/ 
Mobile 
No Response 
What type of 
input did you 
use: 
81.6% 16.7% 1.7% 
 
Four users performed very poorly on 
Nouncaptcha, with average prompt scores at least 
2.48 standard deviations below the mean. Based 
on survey data, it appears these users may have 
mis-interpreted the goal of Nouncaptcha as 
“check all the nouns” and did not consider the 
prompt image. There was also one user who 
reported connection problems during the survey 
that prevented them from properly completing 
their CAPTCHA prompts. Because these users 
were particularly anomalous, they are not 
included in the following data analysis.  
 
9.2   Data 
 
 Appendix III contains histograms of 
reCAPTCHA and Nouncaptcha completion 
times.  
 Appendix IV contains a breakdown and 
analysis of user preferences when comparing 
reCAPTCHA and Nouncaptcha.   
 Appendix V outlines a test of statistical 
significance for Nouncaptcha pass rates. 
 Appendix VI evaluates touch and mobile user 
perceptions of Nouncaptcha. 
Nouncaptcha 11 
Jeakle 
 Appendix VII contains a summary of data for 
omitted users. 
 
Survey Data 
 Yes No No Response 
Did you 
understand 
Nouncaptcha’s 
instructions: 
96.4% 1.8% 1.8% 
Were images 
large enough 
and easy to 
understand: 
94.5% 3.6% 1.8% 
Were 
Nouncaptcha 
answers 
obvious: 
76.4% 21.8% 1.8% 
Were 
reCAPTCHA 
answers 
obvious: 
74.5% 21.8% 3.6% 
 
Preferred Input Style 
Checkboxes Text Input No Response 
74.5% 23.6% 1.8% 
 
Contentious Tag Data 
Avg candidate tags per image: 7.8 
Unique nouns in candidate set: 68 
Avg contentious tags per image: 
(among those with contentious tags) 
2.36 
Unique nouns in contentious set: 37 
Percentage of images with 
contentious tags: 
66% 
Contentious tags were pre-seeded by word of mouth 
requests that colleagues and friends try Nouncaptcha. 
 
CAPTCHA Completion Times (in seconds) 
Type Mean: Min: Max: 
reCAPTCHA 11.79 4.19 72.34 
Nouncaptcha 
(per-prompt) 
12.73 2.45 117.18 
Nouncaptcha 
(full version) 
38.93 11.49 46.64 
 
Nouncaptcha success rate 
(A pass requires 2 or more points in 5 rounds) 
Type Pass: Fail: 
Practice Round 81% 19% 
Real-world Round 89% 11% 
Survey Instrument and logging detailed in Appendix II. 
 
9.3   Results 
Among the 55 non-anomalous users, reCAPTCHA 
completion times averaged 11.58 seconds, while 
individual Nouncaptcha prompts averaged 12.73 
seconds. The survey also tested a full 
Nouncaptcha, which required a user to get 2 
points in 5 prompts to succeed. This full 
Nouncaptcha took an average of 38.27 seconds to 
complete. Ultimately, no statistically significant 
conclusions could be drawn from user 
perceptions of speed. In future studies it may be 
worthwhile to determine whether users find the 
speed difference between reCAPTCHA and 
Nouncaptcha noticeable. 
 
Beyond speed, users were questioned about ease 
of use and preference. There was statistically 
significant evidence that users more often found 
Nouncaptcha easier than reCAPTCHA. Likewise, 
users more frequently preferred Nouncaptcha 
than reCAPTCHA for general use (see Appendix 
IV). Unfortunately, in an analysis of touch and 
mobile users, there were too few respondents to 
draw statistically significant conclusions (see 
Appendix VI). In a future study, it may be valuable 
to specifically recruit mobile users so their 
experience can be evaluated. Still, these findings 
are promising and provide evidence that the 
Nouncaptcha design is one that users prefer. 
 
Along with a comparison to reCAPTCHA, there 
were two stages of Nouncaptcha performance 
testing. The first was a practice round, where 
users were not given any feedback and completed 
5 Nouncaptcha prompts. User performance was 
tracked during this round in terms of score 
(                    ). The practice round 
scores were then evaluated to see if the users 
would pass a real Nouncaptcha. Based on the 2 
points in 5 prompts criteria, 81% of users passed 
the practice round. After statistical analysis it was 
concluded that this pass rate was not in line with 
this paper’s 90% goal (see Appendix V). 
Fortunately, users fared much better on the real 
thing, with 89% of users passing a real-world 
Nouncaptcha prompt. After analysis, this pass 
rate was found statistically consistent with a 90% 
pass rate (see Appendix V). 
 
Despite this preliminary success, future tests will 
be necessary. For example, in an ideal world 
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Nouncaptcha would be backed by many more 
tags than this test had access to. Also, a full-scale 
deployment would benefit from an ever growing 
contentious tags list. Understanding how the 
contentious tags list performs in conjunction with 
a much larger tag set is important. Such 
interactions may make Nouncaptcha easier, and 
improve the pass rate beyond 90%. On the other 
hand, it is possible that the contentious tags list 
simply cannot be grown fast enough to keep up 
with the confusing options for an image. The 
contentious tags list may also grow too quickly, 
reducing Nouncaptcha’s underlying complexity. 
 
Finally, it is important to discuss the 5 dropped 
outliers. 4 of these users were dropped due to 
extremely anomalous scores on the Nouncaptcha 
practice round. Based on survey input, it appears 
at least one of these scores was the result of 
misunderstanding or ignoring Nouncaptcha’s 
instructions. The fifth dropped user reported 
connection issues that prevented their 
completion of a full Nouncaptcha. This appears to 
be supported by the user’s Nouncaptcha 
completion time of 212.27 seconds. This 
completion time was more than 5.5 standard 
deviations above the mean. The decision was 
made to omit these users from this paper’s 
analysis because their experience was not 
representative of the typical Nouncaptcha user. 
 
Still, making Nouncaptcha accommodating to all 
people requires addressing the difficulties these 
users experienced.  For example, future iterations 
of nouncaptcha should be designed to prevent 
connection issues. Nouncaptcha currently uses 
websockets to communicate with the 
Nouncaptcha server. Unfortunately, this means 
Nouncaptcha requires a persistent connection to 
function. Moving from websockets to a RESTful 
design would hopefully make Nouncaptcha usable 
on more inconsistent networks. Also, instructions 
should be made more obvious. One possible 
option would be to implement a tutorial that 
walks users through Nouncaptcha. This tutorial 
could be played only when a user does not have a 
cookie set, or if a user’s IP address has not been 
seen a sufficient number of times. 
10. Threat Analysis 
For Nouncaptcha to be viable it must not only be 
easy to use, but also secure. To evaluate 
Nouncaptcha’s security, this paper will consider 
several attack vectors image based CAPTCHAs are 
vulnerable to. Due to the nature of CAPTCHAs, 
Nouncaptcha cannot guarantee an attacker 
cannot pass. This is because by definition any 
human should be able to pass a prompt. Instead 
Nouncaptcha’s goal is to prevent automated 
solutions being realistically viable. Acceptable bot 
success rates are estimated between .6% 
(60/10,000) and .01% (1/10,000) [2, 7, 12]. In 
general, it appears researchers opt for the more 
stringent 1/10,000 figure. 
 
10.1 Brute Force Guessing 
The most straightforward method of 
compromising a CAPTCHA is by brute force. In this 
case an attacker would randomly guess until 
admitted by a Nouncaptcha. Under the current 
scheme an attacker has a 1/4096 probability of 
admittance via guessing. Despite this moderately 
high probability of success, random guessing 
would be easy to identify at the IP address level. 
Nouncaptcha could then rate limit such users, 
perhaps by requiring a higher score for 
admittance. Even a minimum score of 3 would 
drop the probability of random success to 1 / 218, 
or .00038%.  
 
10.2 Brute Force Using A Botnet 
A bot net poses a unique threat to Nouncaptcha, 
because the attacker is able to use many IP 
addresses at once. This distributes the risk of 
detection and makes it difficult for Nouncaptcha 
to use the suggested brute force prevention 
strategy. Ultimately, bot nets are a very difficult 
adversary to address. As such, they have been 
deemed outside the scope of this paper. Such an 
attack is possible, however, and it would be of 
value for future research to investigate a solution.  
 
10.3 Dictionary Attacks 
Nouncaptcha is hard for bots because the 
database backing it is difficult for an attacker to 
recreate. Should that database be compromised, 
however, Nouncaptcha would become trivial to 
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defeat. Because of this, the information backing 
Nouncaptcha must be secured. Such security 
considerations extend beyond a direct data 
breech, as slowly leaking information through 
prompts is equally compromising.  
 
One strategy to capture information from 
prompts would be to assemble a dictionary of 
correct responses, perhaps by paying users to 
solve Nouncaptcha prompts. Those responses 
could then be replayed as a solution when the 
same image is displayed again. This attack would 
depend on a fairly limited database size, both in 
terms of images, and in terms of tags on those 
images. Nouncaptcha defends itself from this 
form of attack by randomly selecting prompt 
images, as well as by randomly selecting the 
correct and incorrect nouns for a prompt. This 
makes it very unlikely that an attacker would see 
the same image again, or even the same set of 
options on that image. The overall probability of 
such an event approaches 0 as the size of 
Nouncaptcha’s database grows.  
 
It is the goal of the guessing game to ensure this 
database size assumption holds. The guessing 
game pulls from Flickr’s creative commons 
licensed images. At the moment there are several 
hundred million such images on Flickr, and the 
number continues to grow [19]. Also, there are 
more than 85,000 nouns currently being used in 
the English language [20]. Given such a problem 
space, it is not unreasonable to believe the 
guessing game could keep Nouncaptcha’s 
database sufficiently large. 
 
If assembling a dictionary could be automated, 
however, the low probability of success becomes 
a non-issue for an attacker. To automate 
collection an attacker could simply guess and 
attempt to expose every prompt, identifying 
correct guesses along the way. To mitigate this, 
no information about a user’s performance on 
individual Nouncaptcha prompts is exposed. For 
example, the user is not told their current score, 
nor is the user informed exactly how many 
prompts remain. Such information would allow an 
attacker to determine which prompts an 
algorithm guessed incorrectly. Instead the 
attacker is forced to view their performance in 
aggregate, as a pass or fail on the entire 
Nouncaptcha. Without information on exactly 
which prompts were guessed incorrectly, the 
attacker cannot determine which guesses to store 
as solutions from partially correct runs. This is 
important because such partially correct runs 
would make up the majority of a bot’s attempts. 
The attacker could always have a human audit the 
computer’s guesses, but this brings the attacker 
back to a much lower maximum speed. 
 
10.4 Computer Vision Attacks 
Finally, there is the threat of a computer vision 
attack defeating Nouncaptcha. At the moment, 
computer vision is most effective when targeted 
classifiers are used, such as Support Vector 
Machines (SVM) or a neural network. The state of 
the art in image classification can be observed in 
the PASCAL Visual Object Classes (VOC) Challenge 
[21]. The winning solutions to the 2012 VOC 
Challenges all required that an algorithm be 
trained for a specific classification. Given this, 
defeating Nouncaptcha using computer vision 
would require a classifier be trained for a 
significant portion of English language nouns. This 
is a tremendous problem space, and it is unlikely 
that building and training such a huge set of 
classifiers would be easier than paying humans to 
solve Nouncaptcha prompts. 
 
In a similar vein, Zhu, et al. concluded that image 
based CAPTCHAs are weakened when they rely on 
a specific, pre-determined set of categories [27]. 
This is because an attacker can create individual 
classifiers to identify members of pre-determined 
sets. To create an adequately difficult CAPTCHA, 
Zhu, et al. suggest CAPTCHA designers use “…an 
unlimited number of different types of objects” 
[27]. Should the guessing game succeed in the 
real world, this is a constraint Nouncaptcha has 
been designed to meet. 
 
There are exceptions to this assumed difficulty, 
however. Nouncaptcha may be fairly easy to 
defeat if guessing game users give obvious tags to 
a large sample of simple images. For example, by 
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analyzing color distribution and other factors an 
attacker could determine whether words like 
forest, beach, ocean, sky, and the like are correct 
tags. Nouncaptcha could defend itself, however, 
by searching its database for images tagged with a 
high percentage of pre-determined “trivial 
nouns”. Those images could then be pruned or 
limited to use in conjunction with harder images. 
 
Finally, recent developments in computer vision 
may weaken the assumption that classifiers must 
be individually designed and trained. A 2011 
study by Stanford and Google researchers 
implemented an unsupervised learning system 
[30]. In that study, a face detector and other 
object classifiers were implemented using only 
unlabeled training data. This system achieved a 
groundbreaking, but relatively low 15.8% success 
rate on a range of test categories. As 
unsupervised learning systems develop, the 
assumption that unconstrained object 
identification is hard for computers may be 
invalidated. Such a development would 
undoubtedly break Nouncaptcha; but as the 
original CAPTCHA paper points out, that is the 
cost of a tremendous AI advancement [1].  
 
11. Conclusion and Future Investigations 
This paper described and tested Nouncaptcha, an 
image based CAPTCHA backed by an ESP game 
implementation. By building off of existing 
literature on image tagging, usability, and 
CAPTCHA design, Nouncaptcha hopes to offer an 
alternative to text-based CAPTCHAs. Nouncaptcha 
fared well in a study of users’ preferences, 
proving both easier and more pleasant than 
reCAPTCHA. Nouncaptcha also achieved a 
reasonable user success rate. Finally, 
Nouncaptcha fared well in this paper’s security 
analysis. 
 
This is not to say there are no experiments that 
could improve Nouncaptcha. For example, it may 
be worthwhile to test a reverse Nouncaptcha, 
where users must identify what nouns are not in 
an image. Such a design may result in faster 
solving times or less ambiguity, because the 
contentious tags list would help make correct 
answers more obvious, rather than making 
incorrect answers more obvious. Further research 
may also implement and test a training system 
that steps new users through a Nouncaptcha. 
Some users did very poorly in Nouncaptcha’s 
testing due to misinterpretation of instructions. 
Addressing this with a tutorial or some other tool 
may alleviate that usability concern. 
 
The guessing game could also be improved. For 
example, Microsoft has done research on ESP 
game adjustments that yield a greater variety of 
tags that are also much more specific [22]. Such 
specific tags may make both correct and incorrect 
options more obvious in Nouncaptcha, hopefully 
increasing the human success rate and solution 
speed.  
 
Finally, Nouncaptcha’s data could be used to 
assist research in various fields. For example, as 
images grow old they could be pruned from 
Nouncaptcha’s database and released as a 
training set for computer vision research. 
Nouncaptcha may also be of use to human 
psychology researchers. For example, contentious 
tags were never explicitly listed for an image, but 
still appear valid to users. It may be interesting to 
determine why such tags did not occur to players 
of the guessing game. 
 
Links 
This paper’s implementation of Nouncaptcha and 
the Guessing Game can be viewed online at 
www.nouncaptcha.com.  
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The image in the Guessing Game screenshot can 
be found at: 
https://www.flickr.com/photos/22746515@N02/
8309080001  
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The image in the Nouncaptcha screenshot can be 
found at: 
https://www.flickr.com/photos/pagedooley/7899
921242  
 
Revisions after Submission for Grading 
The dropped users mentioned in section 9.1 were 
originally noted as performing 2.5 standard 
deviations below the mean. That figure was based 
on notes that were rounded, and has been 
updated to 2.48 standard deviations. 
 
The word “euqal” was corrected to “equal” in 
Appendices IV and V. 
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Appendices: 
Appendix I: 
Guessing Game: Survey Instrument and Logging Details 
 
Survey Prompts: 
Users played the guessing game and were asked the following questions. All questions were optional. 
 What is your native language? 
o Text box 
 Do you speak English? 
o Yes/No 
 What country are you in? 
o Text Box 
 If in the US, what state are you in? 
o Text Box 
 What is your age? 
o Text Box, numeric only 
 What is your gender? 
o Male or Female radio buttons 
 How much education do you have (or are getting)? 
o Radio Buttons 
o Less than high school, high school, associates, bachelors, greater than a bachelors 
 What type of input did you use? 
o Radio buttons, with other corresponding to a text box 
o Mouse and keyboard, touch, or other (Please List) 
 Did you enjoy the game? 
o Yes/No 
 Did you follow the game’s instructions? 
o Yes/No 
 Did you only provide nouns in your responses? 
o Yes/No 
 Were the images large enough and easy to understand? 
o Yes/No 
 How did you find this survey? 
o Text 
 Do you have any suggestions or input on the game? 
o Free response text box 
 Leave any additional comments here. 
o Free  response text box 
Survey available at: http://www.nouncaptcha.com/game_survey  
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Logging Strategy 
The game logged 7 kinds of events: 
1. New game start 
2. Seed guesses generated (from first round for an image) 
3. Match (W/ JSON of partner’s guess list, and matched word) 
4. Skip (W/ JSON of partner’s guess list and player’s guess list) 
5. New image sent 
6. Disconnect 
7. Game issues 
The Game also logged the number of visits to the guessing game through a specific link. 
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Appendix II: 
Nouncaptcha: Survey Instrument and Logging Strategy 
 
Survey Prompts: 
Users completed 3 reCAPTCHA prompts, 5 Nouncaptcha practice rounds, a real Nouncaptcha, and 
answered the following questions. All questions were optional. 
 At the top of the survey users are reminded that “reCAPTCHA was entering text, nouncaptcha 
was checking boxes” 
 What is your native language? 
o Text box 
 Do you speak English? 
o Yes/No 
 What country are you in? 
o Text Box 
 If in the US, what state are you in? 
o Text Box 
 What is your age? 
o Text Box, numeric only 
 What is your gender? 
o Male or Female radio buttons 
 How much education do you have (or are getting)? 
o Radio Buttons 
o Less than high school, high school, associates, bachelors, greater than a bachelors 
 What type of input did you use? 
o Radio buttons, with other corresponding to a text box 
o Mouse and keyboard, touch, or other (Please List) 
 Did you understand nouncaptcha’s instructions? 
o Yes/No 
 Were the images large enough and easy to understand? 
o Yes/No 
 Which style of CAPTCHA did you prefer? 
o Radio buttons 
o Checkboxes, Text input 
 Did the answers to the check box CAPTCHA seem obvious? 
o Yes/No 
 Did the answers to the reCAPTCHA prompts seem obvious? 
o Yes/No  
 Which CAPTCHA was easier? 
o 5 Radio buttons on a Likert scale 
o The first indicates the user strongly felt reCAPTCHA was easier 
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o The next one indicates a less strong sentiment, but a preference for reCAPTCHA 
o The third button indicates no sentiment either way 
o The fourth indicates slight preference for Nouncaptcha 
o The last one indicates a strong preference for Nouncaptcha 
 Which CAPTCHA was faster? 
o Same 5 radio button format as above 
 Which CAPTCHA would you rather use for both mobile and desktop computing? 
o Same 5 radio button format as above 
 How did you come across this survey? 
o Text box 
 Do you have any suggestions, comments, or input for nouncaptcha? 
o Free response text box 
Survey available at: http://www.nouncaptcha.com/captcha_survey  
Logging Strategy 
The Nouncaptcha survey logged: 
1. Completion time and answers for 3 reCAPTCHA prompts 
2. Completion time and score for 5 Nouncaptcha rounds (practice) 
3. Completion time and whether or not passed for a full Nouncaptcha prompt 
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Appendix III: 
CAPTCHA Response Time Histograms 
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Appendix IV: 
reCAPTCHA vs Nouncaptcha Comparison, Statistical analysis 
(Responses are on a Likert scale) 
 
Which CAPTCHA is Easier? 
Strongly Prefer reCAPTCHA: 9.1% 
Somewhat Prefer reCAPTCHA: 12.7% 
No Preference: 16.4% 
Somewhat Prefer Nouncaptcha: 36.4% 
Strongly Prefer Nouncaptcha: 23.6% 
No Response: 1.8% 
 
Which CAPTCHA is Faster? 
Strongly Prefer reCAPTCHA: 18.2% 
Somewhat Prefer reCAPTCHA: 9.1% 
No Preference: 16.4% 
Somewhat Prefer Nouncaptcha: 27.3% 
Strongly Prefer Nouncaptcha: 27.3% 
No Response: 1.8% 
 
Which CAPTCHA Would You Rather Use? 
Strongly Prefer reCAPTCHA: 16.4% 
Somewhat Prefer reCAPTCHA: 3.6% 
No Preference: 14.5% 
Somewhat Prefer Nouncaptcha: 29.1% 
Strongly Prefer Nouncaptcha: 34.5% 
No Response: 1.8% 
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Chi-Squared Test: 
H0: These results were due to random chance. 
HA: These results were not a random occurrence. 
 
A random distribution would have 
  
 
      responses per option.  
Chi squared statistic approximation: 
         
    
 
         
    
 
         
    
 
          
    
 
          
    
        
With 4 degrees of freedom this evaluates to: .01 < p < .05 
 Conclusion: One can be 95% confident the easiness comparison data were not a random 
result. 
Sign Test - Binomial: 
H0: The frequency at which users found reCAPTCHA easier was equal to the frequency at which users 
found Nouncaptcha easier. 
HA: The frequencies are different. 
Probability of a random selection being in favor of a given option: 0.5 
 
Left-side (“Failures”/favor reCAPTCHA): 12 
Right-side (“Successes”/favor Nouncaptcha): 33 
P(2-tailed) = 0.0024589 < .05 
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 Conclusion: There was statistically significant evidence that the frequencies differed, at the 
95% level. 
 By inspection one can see the frequency at which users found Nouncaptcha easier outweighs 
the frequency at which reCAPTCHA was found easier. 
 With 95% confidence, one can conclude more often users find Nouncaptcha easier than 
recaptcha. 
 
 
Chi-Squared Test: 
H0: These results were due to random chance. 
HA: These results were not a random occurrence. 
 
A random distribution would have 
  
 
      responses per option.  
Chi squared statistic approximation: 
          
    
 
         
    
 
         
    
 
          
    
 
          
    
       
With 4 degrees of freedom this evaluates to: .10 < p < .20 
 Conclusion: There was no particularly significant evidence that this data is not a random 
result. No meaningful infrences can be reliably derived from this sample. 
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Chi-Squared Test: 
H0: These results were due to random chance. 
HA: These results were not a random occurrence. 
 
A random distribution would have 
  
 
      responses per option.  
Chi squared statistic approximation: 
         
    
 
         
    
 
         
    
 
          
    
 
          
    
        
With 4 degrees of freedom this evaluates to: .001 < p < .01 
 Conclusion: One can be 99% confident that these results were not due to random chance. 
Sign Test - Binomial: 
H0: The frequency at which users found reCAPTCHA preferable was equal to the frequency at which 
users found Nouncaptcha preferable. 
HA: The frequencies are different. 
Probability of a random selection being in favor of a given option: 0.5 
 
Left-side (“Failures”/favor reCAPTCHA): 11 
Right-side (“Successes”/favor Nouncaptcha): 35 
P(2-tailed) = 0.000535586 < .05 
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 Conclusion: There was statistically significant evidence that the frequencies differed, at the 
95% level. 
 By inspection one can see the frequency at which users found Nouncaptcha preferable for 
general use outweighs the frequency at which reCAPTCHA was found preferable. 
 With 95% confidence, one can conclude more often users preferred Nouncaptcha than 
reCAPTCHA for general use. 
  (Note: general use in this case means “both mobile and desktop use”, as that is how the 
corresponding question was written on the survey) 
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Appendix V. 
Chi-Squared test of significance for  
observed pass rate vs. 90% goal CAPTCHA pass rate. 
 
Nouncaptcha success rate 
(A pass requires 2 or more points in 5 rounds) 
Type Pass: Fail: 
Practice Round 45 10 
Real-world Round 49 6 
 
H0: Nouncaptcha pass rate was 90% 
HA: Nouncaptcha pass rate was different from 90% 
Degrees of freedom: 1 
Critical Value for 95% confidence interval (CI), at 1 deg of freedom: 3.84 
Critical Value for 20% confidence interval (CI), at 1 deg of freedom: 0.06 
 
Practice Round Nouncaptcha: 
Observed Pass Rate:45 
Expected Pass Rate: 55 * .9 = 45.9 
Observed Fail Rate:10 
Observed Fail Rate: 55 * .1 = 5.5 
 
Chi Squared Test: 
          
    
 
         
   
       
Critical Value Comparison (95% CI): 4.09 is not < 3.84 
 Conclusion: The practice round pass rate is not statistically consistent with the desired 90% 
pass rate when requiring 95% confidence to reject H0. 
 
Real-World Nouncaptcha:  
Observed Pass Rate: 49 
Expected Pass Rate: 55 * .9 = 49.5 
Observed Fail Rate: 6 
Expected Fail Rate: 55 * .1 = 5.5 
 
Chi Squared Test: 
          
    
 
        
   
         
Critical Value Comparison (95% CI): 0.0505 < 3.84 
Critical Value Comparison (20% CI): 0.0505 < .06 
 Conclusion: The real-world Nouncaptcha pass rate is statistically consistent with the desired 
90% pass rate, even when requiring 20% confidence to reject H0.  
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Appendix VI: 
Touch and mobile user data 
Respondent breakdown 
Qty of responses: 10 
Age: Mean: 35.0 Min: 21 Max: 54 
Gender: Male: 50% Female: 50% 
Speak English: Yes: 100% No: 0% 
Native English 
Speaker: 
Yes: 90% No Response: 10% 
 
Education Level (Attending or Attained) 
No Response: 0% 
Less than High School: 0% 
High School: 10% 
Associates: 0% 
BS: 80% 
Greater than a BS: 10% 
 
Survey Data 
 Yes No 
Did you understand 
Nouncaptcha’s 
instructions: 
90% 10% 
Were images large 
enough and easy to 
understand: 
100% 0% 
Were Nouncaptcha 
answers obvious: 
80% 20% 
Were reCAPTCHA 
answers obvious: 
80% 20% 
 
Preferred Input Style 
Checkboxes Text Input 
70% 30% 
 
CAPTCHA Completion Times (in seconds) 
Type Mean: Min: Max: 
reCAPTCHA 11.77 4.62 37.39 
Nouncaptcha 
(per-prompt) 
11.56 2.45 44.47 
Nouncaptcha 
(full version) 
29.92 11.49 53.51 
 
Nouncaptcha success rate 
(A pass requires 2 or more points in 5 rounds) 
Type Pass: Fail: 
Practice Round 80% 20% 
Real-world Round 90% 10% 
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Chi-Squared Test: 
H0: These results were due to random chance. 
HA: These results were not a random occurrence. 
 
A random distribution would have 
  
 
   responses per option.  
Chi squared statistic approximation: 
      
 
 
      
 
 
      
 
 
      
 
 
      
 
  8 
With 4 degrees of freedom this evaluates to: .05 < p < .10 
 Conclusion: One can be 90% confident the easiness comparison results were not a random result. 
Sign Test - Binomial: 
H0: The frequency at which users found reCAPTCHA easier was equal to the frequency at which users found 
Nouncaptcha easier. 
HA: The frequencies are different. 
Probability of a random selection being in favor of a given option: 0.5 
 
Left-side (“Failures”/favor reCAPTCHA): 1 
Right-side (“Successes”/favor Nouncaptcha): 6 
P(2-tailed) = 0.1250 is not < .05 
 Conclusion: There was not statistically significant evidence that the frequencies differed, at the 95% 
level. 
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Chi-Squared Test: 
H0: These results were due to random chance. 
HA: These results were not a random occurrence. 
 
A random distribution would have 
  
 
   responses per option.  
Chi squared statistic approximation: 
      
 
 
      
 
 
      
 
 
      
 
 
      
 
  4 
With 4 degrees of freedom this evaluates to: .50 < p < .30 
 Conclusion: At the 95% level, one cannot be confident the preference comparison results were 
not a random result.  
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Appendix VII: 
Dropped user data (5 users) 
Respondent breakdown 
Qty of responses: 5 
Age: Mean: 42.6 Min: 39 Max: 47 
Gender: Male: 60% Female: 40% 
Speak English: Yes: 100% No: 0% 
Native English 
Speaker: 
Yes: 80% No: 10% 
(Spoke Tamil) 
 
Education Level (Attending or Attained) 
No Response: 0% 
Less than High School: 0% 
High School: 0% 
Associates: 20% 
BS: 60% 
Greater than a BS: 20% 
 
Device Types (Self-reported) 
 Keyboard Touch/ 
Mobile 
No Response 
What type of 
input did you 
use: 
100% 0% 0% 
 
Survey Data 
 Yes No No Response 
Did you understand 
Nouncaptcha’s instructions: 
80% 20% 0% 
Were images large enough and 
easy to understand: 
100% 0% 0% 
Were Nouncaptcha answers 
obvious: 
60% 40% 0% 
Were reCAPTCHA answers 
obvious: 
60% 20% 20% 
 
Preferred Input Style 
Checkboxes Text Input No Response 
60% 40% 0% 
 
CAPTCHA Completion Times (in seconds) 
Type Mean: Min: Max: 
reCAPTCHA 12.73 8.08 23.36 
Nouncaptcha 
(per-prompt) 
11.78 3.74 39.90 
Nouncaptcha 
(full version) 
81.01 40.88 212.27 
 
Nouncaptcha success rate 
(A pass requires 2 or more points in 5 rounds) 
Type Pass: Fail: 
Practice Round 0% 100% 
Real-world Round 0% 100% 
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Sentiment Data Summary 
 Easier Faster Preferable for Desktop 
and Mobile Use 
1 – Strongly prefer reCAPTCHA 40% 40% 40% 
2 – prefer reCAPTCHA 0% 20% 0% 
3 – No Preference 20% 0% 20% 
4 – prefer Nouncaptcha 40% 0% 0% 
5 – Strongly prefer Nouncaptcha 0% 40% 40% 
Due to the small sample size no statistics were evaluated on these data. 
 
This graph shows the performance difference between typical users, and the 4 dropped low performers.  
2 points in 5 rounds are required to pass, and 5 prompts were presented in the practice round. An average score of .4 (2/5) is 
considered passing. 
Relevant user feedback: 
"My internet connection went a bit wonky on the last bit so my data may be a bit off " 
“I misunderstood the nouncaptcha directions.  I thought I was supposed to select every noun and wasn't 
sure what the picture was for.  I read the instructions but don't remember them saying to only pick the 
nouns associated with the pictures, if that was what I was supposed to do. I just checked every noun.” 
(The other 3 users said “Thanks”, “No”, and “No” in the feedback/comments box) 
